The impact of a monopolist or monopsonist on by the buyer (node k+l), thus potentially the price and output performance in comparison eliminating much of the risk of quality uncertainwith perfectly competitive markets is well ties. Such control benefits may be partially or documented. These markets are coordinated totally offset by the transactions cost of maintainthrough spot market exchanges. However, most ing the non-spot exchange mechanisms. markets have combinations of alternative vertical exchange mechanisms (contracts, vertical integration, spot exchange, etc.) . The price and MULTIPLE EXCHANGE MECHANISM output performance of a multiple exchange MODEL mechanism (M.E.M.) market when compared to a spot exchange mechanism (S.E.M.) market Commodity x is produced with the input w asneeds additional conceptual modeling. This suming a traditional type production function as paper evaluates the relative performance beexpressed in equation (1), tween markets with and without multiple exchange mechanisms, using a model derived with an explicit set of production functions.
A decline of spot markets and the continual emergence of contracts and vertical integration product calls for a better understanding of the economic Y consequences of using multiple exchange mechanisms. Most research has dealt with analysis of firm level inducements for employing alternatives to spot markets (Arrow, Buccola, Logan, Perry, Stigler, Williamson) . This article models n-nl ni N k+ the concept of a multiple exchange mechanism market, using Cobb-Douglas-type production functions. Simulated equilibrium price and market output indexes are developed to draw implivertical cations relative to the performance of a multiple spot contract integration exchange mechanism (M.E.M.) market relative to a spot exchange mechanism (S.E.M.) market. The alternative mechanisms for exchange are illustrated in Figure 1 . The transfer of x from node k to k+ 1 through a -ml NODE k spot transaction does not provide a mechanism for direct control of the production and transfer functions by the buyer or seller. Such product I characteristics are quality, time of delivery, and quantity are left virtually uncontrolled, except by the spot price negotiated. In contrast, contractproduct ing can provide direct control over the production and transfer functions. The risk of inferior product characteristics, uncertain prices, and poor technology can be reduced. With backward FIGURE 1. Alternative Exchange Arrangeintegration, product characteristics and the techments for Product x nology used to produce x are directly controlled -
marginal cost of x is equated to the price of x. This cost includes fixed and variable production where 0 < al < 1.0 and (1 + d) >= 0.0. If paramcost and the relative difference in transactions eter d > 0, then the productivity of w can be cost among coordinating mechanisms. The cost improved with non-spot exchange. For example, of producing x with specific production characif, through vertical integration, nl firms at node teristics is defined in equation (4), where Pw ink+ 1 in Figure 1 start producing x, the firms then cludes the spot market transactions cost associhave greater control over the technical proated with transferring product x from node k to cesses. Productivity may be improved if d > 0, k+ 1 plus the price of the input w. and technical control over production may lead to the output of x having more desirable quality (4) c = w Pw [l+q] + fixed costs characteristics. However, the situation could exist in which a non-spot mechanism leads to The component q represents the net difference in lower productivity (e.g., non-mechanized hartransactions cost for supplying x through one of vesting) such that -1 < d < 0.
the non-spot exchange mechanisms instead of The input x used in producing y is assumed to the spot mechanism. Note that the 1 + q > 0 be usable within a narrow band of product implies a positive cost, but does not preclude q < characteristics-timing, quantity, quality, loca-0. Non-spot exchange could lead to greater eftion. For the vertically integrated firm, x would ficiencies, in which case -1 < q < 0. be produced with those product characteristics Using equations (1) and (4), the supply curve needed for the production of y. Under contractfor x follows, assuming marginal cost equals Px: ing, the producer of y can specify the desired product characteristics for x and improve pro- 
Given that n firms demand and m supply x of which Let f represent the adjustments in y from using nl and ml use a nonspot exchange, then the market input x where the product characteristics of x demand and supply are readily calculated for the vary within the narrow band discussed above.
M.E.M. market.
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The production process assumed is (6) xD = Exds + hh xds = [n-nl+nlh]xds (7) xS = Yxss + Ir xss = [m-ml+mlr]xss where (1 + f) > = 0.0 and 0 < bl < 1.0; y = final firm output; and x = input with a band of variaDefine Ed = l/ ) and Es (al/(l-a)), and tion in product characteristics. Assuming that x equating equations (6) and (7), then an equilibis employed up to where the marginal value rium price product equals the input price (Px) and using Ds n(l-n + n*h) /(Ed+Es)) equation (2) The firm's supply of x is generated where the 1 -m*+m*r Values of RP > 1.0 imply a greater equilibrium
Taylor series approximation to the function. price under a M.E.M. market relative to a Using the expansion up to the first derivative, the S.E.M. market, and this condition will be true so remaining components of (11) Equation (14) can be used to explore the conditions in which output from a M.E.M. market (10) h[m*-n*] > [(1-n*)/n*][n*-m*] would exceed that from a spot mechanism market. Using the equilibrium condition shown earUsing (10) (14) for r, the constraints on the ket is expected to have inflationary effects on the product characteristics parameter (f) follow. input price Px. Whereas, if m* < n*, price will fall in the M.E.M. market relative to a market Es n* + Ed m* 1-n* with all spot transactions. This conclusion shows (15)) the direction of change, while all parameters must be known if the absolute level of RP is to be Es n* + Ed m* I-n* (/E) calculated. Referring to the relative price index (16) f >Es + -1E (equation (9)) and using the condition where m* Es(1-n*)+Ed(1-m*) n* > n*, then the relative price will be greater than f one so long as
. This inequality h s h mh e eecte, gven altenatve has a more intuitive interpretation in that so long changes that might be expected, given alternative has a more intuitive interpretation in that so long levels of non-spot coordination (n*,m*). Simulaas the shift in the demand resulting from the use leves of non-spot coordination (n*,md ). Simulaof a non-spot mechanism exceeds the supply tions of these limits are illustrated in Figures 2 of a non-spot mechanism exceeds the supply and 3. Before discussing (16) in detail, one genshift, the resulting equilibrium price will rise an 3 Beore discsin (1) i detail, one genabove that with spot transactions only eral coordinate of interest occurs when n*=m*. e tt wh st t o In this restrictive case, total output will always be greater in a M.E.M. market so long as f > 0
RELATIVE OUTPUT PERFORMANCE
[see equation (2)].
If the proportion of non-spot coordination is Supplies forthcoming from M.E.M. and weighted to the demand side (i.e., n*>m*), the S.E.M. markets are readily shown, using the M.E.M. market output will be larger so long as supply function in (7) and the equilibrium price of the product characteristics (f) differential be-(8). The ratio of these supplies then gives a direct tween spot and non-spot commodities is greater measurement of the perfo of teof the M.E.M. than the negative f-min in Figure 2 . Assuming that market to the S.E.M. markets, as derived in equnon-spot exchange mechanism improves proation (11).3 ductivity (i.e., f >0), then a M.E.M. market leads to greater output when n* > m*. But when the
proportion of sellers using a non-spot mechanism n*+n*h](Es/(Ed+Es)) is greater than those buying (m* > n*), then in order for M.E.M. markets to be larger than spot When RS is greater than one, the M.E.M. markets, the characteristics of the product exsupplies exceed S.E.M. market output. Equation changed through a non-spot mechanism must be (11) does not provide an immediate set of condisignificantly greater than zero or f > f-min. The tions on the parameters for determining when value of f must be above the surface shown in RS > 1.0 because both values in the brackets are Figure 2 . raised to a power of the elasticities. If RS > 1.0
The relative magnitude of output in a M.E.M. then [1-m*+m*r]ED> [1-n*+n*h] -E s. Each market varies also with the uniqueness of each function can be expanded around 1.0, using a industry, as measured with the elasticities of supply and demand. When the non-spot intensity is concentrated among the buyers (n* > m*), then the minimum level of f lies below the zero plane in Figure 3 . If the non-spot mechanism assures that f > 0, then net gains in output through a M.E.M. market would always be expected, regardless of the elasiticity levels. Furthermore, this increase in output would occur while the new · '\.^ ~ T20.59~ equilibrium price is lower than would be the case 17.33 with spot transactions only [see equation (9)]. In Characteristics Required for a MEM Market kets. In general, agricultural markets are most Output to be Greater than SEM Market likely depicted by the lower plane where n* > m* or where many producers face a few buyers. The model suggests that multiple mechanisms would lead to greater output at lower equilibrium prices. The fact that n < m does not assure that n* > m*; but there should be a high positive correlation between the two.
